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Abstract
Real-world economies are open-ended dynamic systems consisting of hetero-
geneous interacting participants. Human participants are decision-makers
who strategically take into account the past actions and potential future
actions of other participants. All participants are forced to be locally con-
structive, meaning their actions at any given time must be based on their
local states; and participant actions at any given time affect future local
states. Taken together, these essential properties imply real-world economies
are locally-constructive sequential games. This paper discusses a modeling
approach, Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE), that permits re-
searchers to study economic systems from this point of view. ACE modeling
principles and objectives are first concisely presented and explained. The
remainder of the paper then highlights challenging issues and edgier explo-
rations that ACE researchers are currently pursuing.
Keywords: Economic systems, local constructivity, sequential game,
agent-based computational economics
1. Introduction
Real-world economies exhibit five essential properties. First, they consist
of heterogeneous interacting participants characterized by distinct local states
(data, attributes, methods) at each given time. Second, they are open-ended
dynamic systems whose dynamics are driven by the successive interactions of
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their participants. Third, human participants are strategic decision-makers
whose decision processes take into account past actions and potential future
actions of other participants. Fourth, all participants are locally constructive,
i.e., constrained to act on the basis of their own local states at each given
time. Fifth, the actions taken by participants at any given time affect future
local states and hence induce system reflexivity.1
These five essential properties imply that real-world economies are locally-
constructive sequential games.2 Two key questions can thus be posed. Do
modeling tools exist that permit real-world economies to be represented and
implemented as locally-constructive sequential games? If so, can these mod-
eling tools usefully advance the state of economic knowledge?
This study answers both of these questions in the affirmative, focusing
specifically on Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) for concrete il-
lustration.3 ACE is the computational study of economic processes, including
whole economies, as open-ended dynamic systems of interacting agents (Tes-
fatsion, 2017a). The driving concern in the development of ACE has been
to provide a flexible modeling approach that enables a researcher to specify
and implement a model for a problem at hand with a degree of empirical
verisimilitude appropriate for this problem. In particular, modelers should
not be forced to rely on a priori model specifications whose only justification
is analytical tractability.
ACE is a specialization to economics of the more broadly conceived ap-
proach referred to as Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) (Axelrod and Tesfatsion,
1See Davis (2007, 2016) for a more precise definition and discussion of reflexivity for
economic systems.
2Sequential games, also referred to as extensive-form games, are dynamic games in
which multiple players undertake sequential decision making. Since decision-making play-
ers are informed, at a minimum, about their own decision histories, their states evolve
over time. For a basic introduction to game theory in general, and sequential games in
particular, see Eatwell et al. (1989).
3This study is an extended version of a keynote address given at the Duke Forest
Conference (Durham, NC, Nov. 11-13, 2016), titled “Economic Systems as Constructively
Rational Games: Oh, the Places We Could Go!.” Some of the materials in this study
are adapted from Axelrod and Tesfatsion (2006), Borrill and Tesfatsion (2011), LeBaron
and Tesfatsion (2008), and Tesfatsion (2017a). Annotated pointers to ACE tutorials,
publications, demos, software, research groups, and research area sites are posted at the
ACE website (Tesfatsion, 2017a). For broad ACE/ABM overviews, see Arthur (2015),
Chen (2016), Epstein (2006), Kirman (2011), and Tesfatsion (2006).
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2006). Although the precise meaning of ABM continues to be debated in the
ABM literature, seven specific modeling principles have been developed for
ACE that carefully distinguish it from other types of modeling and that
highlight its particular relevance for the study of economic systems.
The seven modeling principles underlying ACE model design are pre-
sented and explained in Section 2. Taken together, they express the fun-
damental goal of many agent-based modelers: namely, to be able to study
real-world systems as historical processes unfolding through time.
Section 3 discusses four key objectives currently being pursued by ACE
researchers: empirical understanding; normative design; qualitative insight
and theory generation; and methodological advancement. The achievement
of each of these objectives is critical for the overall success of ACE as a
modeling approach.
The next three sections highlight challenging opportunities for ACE mod-
elers. Section 4 considers distinct empirical validation aspects that researchers
tend to weight differently, depending upon their purpose: input validation;
process validation; in-sample fitting; and out-of-sample forecasting. Al-
though differential weighting by purpose is commonly done, it is argued that
ACE modeling permits researchers to strive for a more comprehensive ap-
proach to empirical validation that simultaneously considers all four aspects.
Section 5 discusses the increasingly important role that ACE models are
playing as computational laboratories for the development and testing of pol-
icy initiatives in advance of implementation. A taxonomy of Policy Readiness
Levels (PRLs) is proposed for policy initiatives ranging from conceptual pol-
icy formulation (PRL 1) to real-world policy implementation (PRL 9). ACE
modeling is helping to bridge the difficult gap between conceptual policy re-
search (PRLs 1-3), typically undertaken at universities, and large-scale policy
models incorporating numerous real-world features (PRL 7) that are favored
by industry, government, and regulatory agencies as a prelude to field studies
(PRL 8) and real-world policy implementations (PRL 9).
An additional potential benefit of the PRL taxonomy is addressed in
Section 6: namely, it could facilitate the development of presentation proto-
cols for economic policy models that appropriately take into account model
purpose and level of model development. This is particularly important for
newer modeling methodologies, such as ACE, which do not yet have estab-
lished presentation practices familiar to large numbers of economists.
Section 7 considers ways in which ACE permits edgier explorations of
critical real-world systems. These include: (i) the study of labor markets
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as evolutionary sequential games with endogenous hiring, firing, and quits
(Section 7.1); (ii) the study of macroeconomies with anticipatory learning by
locally-constructive consumers and firms attempting to achieve intertemporal
objectives (Section 7.2); (iii) the study of risk-management by strategically
interacting rural and urban decision-makers residing within a watershed af-
fected by climate and hydrological processes (Section 7.3); (iv) the study
of new market design features for U.S. electric power systems (Section 7.4);
and (v) the use of ACE modeling principles as design principles guiding
the development of decentralized “transactive energy” architectures for U.S.
transmission and distribution systems (Section 7.5).
In Section 8 it is shown how ACE can be viewed as a limit point of
a broad spectrum of experiment-based modeling approaches ranging from
100% human subject to 100% computer agent. By design, any decision-
making agent in an ACE model can be replaced by a real person. This
opens up huge mix-and-match opportunities to study individual and group
behaviors in realistically rendered contexts. Concluding remarks are provided
in Section 9.
2. ACE Modeling Principles
The following seven modeling principles collectively characterize the ACE
modeling approach:
(MP1) Agent Definition: An agent is a software entity within a computa-
tionally constructed world capable of acting over time on the basis of
its own state, i.e., its own internal data, attributes, and methods.
(MP2) Agent Scope: Agents can represent individuals, social groupings,
institutions, biological entities, and/or physical entities.
(MP3) Agent Local Constructivity: The action of an agent at any given
time is determined as a function of the agent’s own state at that time.
(MP4) Agent Autonomy: Coordination of agent interactions cannot be ex-
ternally imposed by means of free-floating restrictions, i.e., restrictions
not embodied within agent states.
(MP5) System Constructivity: The state of the modeled system at any
given time is determined by the ensemble of agent states at that time.
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(MP6) System Historicity: Given initial agent states, all subsequent events
in the modeled system are determined solely by agent interactions.
(MP7) Modeler as Culture-Dish Experimenter: The role of the modeler is
limited to the setting of initial agent states and to the non-perturbational
observation, analysis, and reporting of model outcomes.
Considered as a collective whole, modeling principles (MP1)–(MP7) em-
body the idea that an ACE model is a computational laboratory permitting
users to explore how changes in initial conditions affect outcomes in a mod-
eled dynamic system over time. This exploration process is analogous to
biological experimentation with cultures in petri dishes. A user sets initial
conditions for a modeled dynamic system in accordance with some purpose at
hand. The user then steps back, and the modeled dynamic system thereafter
runs forward through time as a virtual world whose dynamics are driven by
the interactions of its constituent agents.
The explicit statement of these modeling principles permits ACE to be
distinguished more clearly and carefully from other modeling approaches,
such as standard game theory and general equilibrium modeling within eco-
nomics, and standard usages of state-space modeling by economists, engi-
neers, and physicists. It also permits more precise comparisons between ACE
and important historical antecedents, such as system dynamics (Rahmandad
and Sterman, 2008) and microsimulation (Richiardi, 2013).
Modeling principle (MP1) provides a concise definition of an ACE agent
as a software entity capable of taking actions based on its own local state.
Here, “state” refers to three possibly-empty categories characterizing an
agent at any given time: data (recorded physical sensations, empirical obser-
vations, statistical summaries,...); attributes (physical conditions, financial
conditions, beliefs, preferences...); and methods (data acquisition, physical
laws, data interpretation, logical deduction, optimization routines, learning
algorithms, decision rules, ...). There is no presumption here that the data
acquired by an agent are accurate or complete, or that the methods used by
an agent to process data are without error.
An agent’s state represents the potential of this agent to express various
types of behaviors through its actions. The agent’s actual expressed be-
haviors within its virtual world, while conditioned on the agent’s successive
states, are also constrained and channeled by interactions with other agents.
An important corollary of (MP1) is that agents in ACE models are encap-
sulated software entities, i.e., software entities that package together data,
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attributes, and methods. This encapsulation permits an agent’s internal as-
pects to be partially or completely hidden from other agents.
A person familiar with object-oriented programming (OOP) might won-
der why “agent” is used in (MP1) instead of “object,” or “object template”
(class), since both agents and objects refer to encapsulated software enti-
ties. “Agent” is used in ACE, and in ABM more generally, to stress the
intended application to problem domains that include entities capable of
various degrees of self-governance, self-directed social interactions, and de-
liberate masking of intentions. In contrast, OOP has traditionally interpreted
objects as passive tools developed by a user to aid the accomplishment of a
user-specified task.
The “state” conceptualization in (MP1) differs in two important ways
from state depictions in standard state-space modeling:
(i) Diversity of State Content: The expression of an agent’s state in terms
of data, attribute, and method categories is broader than the standard
depiction of states as vectors of real-valued variables;
(ii) Variability of State Dimension: An agent’s state is not restricted to lie
within a fixed finite-dimensional domain.
Regarding (ii), an agent’s state can evolve over time in open-ended ways.
For example, an agent can continue to augment its data D(t) over successive
times t without need to rely on fixed-dimensional sufficient statistics, and
its attributes α(t) can also vary over time. Moreover, the agent’s methods
M(t) might include a domain R(t) of possible decision rules plus a genetic
algorithm g that involves mutation and recombination operations. When g
operates on R(t), given D(t) and α(t), the result g(R(t);D(t), α(t)) could be
a modified decision-rule domain R(t + ∆t) that has different elements than
R(t) and possibly also a different dimension than R(t).
Modeling principle (MP2) expresses the intended broad scope of the agent
definition provided in (MP1). In particular, in contrast to many agent defini-
tions proposed in the general ABM literature, (MP2) makes clear that ACE
agents are not restricted to human representations. Such a restriction would
require modelers to make unnecessary distinctions between human actions
and the actions of all other kinds of entities. Instead, (MP1) is in accor-
dance with the standard dictionary meaning of agent as any entity able to
take actions that affect subsequent events. ACE researchers can thus repre-
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sent agents at different ontological levels in accordance with their purposes
(Gra¨bner, 2015).
Another way of viewing (MP2) is that it calls for a broad agent taxon-
omy, i.e., a broad classification of agents into ordered groups or categories.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, agents in ACE models can span all the way from pas-
sive physical entities with no cognitive function to active social entities with
sophisticated decision-making capabilities. Moreover, agents can have other
agents as constituent members, thus permitting the modeling and study of
hierarchical systems (Simon, 1962).
Figure 1: Partial agent taxonomy for an ACE macroeconomic model. Up-pointing arrows
denote “is a” relationships and down-pointing arrows denote “has a” relationships.
The process of economic theorizing and model building would be on a
firmer footing if it could routinely be based on an empirically grounded tax-
onomy. What types of human needs and desires are relevant for understand-
ing particular types of economic phenomena? What types of goods and
services meet or could meet these human needs and desires? What types of
facilities exist or could exist to produce these goods and services, and who
participates in these production activities? What kinds of institutions exist
or could exist to distribute these goods and services, and who participates in
these distribution activities? And what types of entities (if any) oversee the
design and/or operation of these institutions, and for what purposes?
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ACE modeling per se provides no answers to these questions; it is a
methodological approach, not a theory. However, ACE modeling provides a
systematic way to incorporate whatever agent taxonomy a researcher believes
is useful for the exploratory study of a particular economic phenomenon. The
researcher is freed from the constrictive binds of analytical tractability and
from the need to rely on narrow fragmented taxonomies arising from artificial
disciplinary boundaries.
The remaining five modeling principles (MP3)–(MP7) imply that ACE
models are state-space models in initial value form (Tesfatsion, 2016). Specif-
ically, an ACE model specifies how an ensemble of agent states varies over
time starting from a given ensemble of agent states at an initial time.
However, these five principles further require this state process to em-
body essential real-world properties, such as local constructivity and system
historicity. Ideally, an ACE model should satisfy the following constructive
Turing-test requirement : Any ACE agent should be replaceable by a real-
world counterpart, linked into the model via a suitable interface. Thus, an
ACE representation of a human decision-maker should be replaceable by a
real person. An ACE representation of a stock market should be replaceable
by an actual stock market. An ACE modeling of an air-conditioning (A/C)
system should be replaceable by an actual A/C system. And so forth.
Modern economic theory also relies heavily on state-space models. How-
ever, these models typically incorporate modeler-imposed rationality, opti-
mality, and equilibrium conditions that could not (or would not) be met by
locally constructive agents interacting within an historical process. For ex-
ample, rational expectations assumptions require ex ante agent expectations
to be consistent with ex post model outcomes. Consequently, as detailed in
(Tesfatsion, 2017b, Section 5), the derivation of rational expectations solu-
tions is a global fixed-point problem requiring the simultaneous consideration
of all time periods without regard for local constructivity and historical pro-
cess constraints.
The five modeling principles (MP3)-(MP7) also require an ACE model to
be fully agent based. That is, all entities capable of acting within an ACE
computationally-constructed world must be modeled as some form of agent.
This requirement has two key advantages. First, it enhances conceptual
transparency; all factors affecting world events must be clearly identified as
an agent or agent component. Second, it facilitates plug-and-play model
scalability. The number of previously-typed agents can easily be increased,
since this does not require changes to the interfaces between agent types.
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Also, high-level architectures (HLAs)4 can be designed for ACE models that
facilitate enlargement of their scope through inclusion of new agent types.
Despite being fully agent based, ACE models can still exhibit emergent
phenomena, here defined to mean system attributes or events that arise from
agent states but that cannot be directly and simply inferred from the forms
of these states.5 Dramatic forms of emergent phenomena include wars and
financial market crashes. Less dramatic forms include the spatial distribu-
tion of cities, segregation patterns, and the persistence of wealth and income
inequality across successive generations of households. The difficulty in in-
ferring such phenomena from agent states is that their proximate causes can
be a complex swirl of agent interactions arising from agent states that also
cause further changes in these states.
For ACE researchers, as for economists in general, the modeling of de-
cision methods for decision-making agents is a primary concern. Here it is
important to correct a major misconception still being expressed by some
commentators uninformed about the powerful capabilities of modern soft-
ware: namely, the misconception that ACE decision-making agents cannot
be as rational (or irrational) as real people.
To the contrary, the constraints on agent decision making implied by mod-
eling principles (MP1)–(MP7) are constraints inherent in every real-world
economic system. As seen in the ACE learning research linked at (Tes-
fatsion, 2017c), the decision methods used by ACE agents can range from
simple behavioral rules to sophisticated anticipatory learning algorithms for
the approximate achievement of intertemporal objectives. A more extended
discussion of this point is provided in Section 7.2.
A second common misconception is the incorrect belief that (MP1)–
(MP7) rule out any consideration of stochasticity. To the contrary, stochastic
aspects can easily be represented within ACE models. Agent data can in-
clude recorded realizations for random events, agent attributes can include
beliefs based on probabilistic assessments, and agent methods can include
pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs). A PRNG is an algorithm, ini-
tialized by a seed value, that is able to generate a number sequence whose
4An HLA is a general purpose framework that manages the interactions among a “fed-
eration” (collection) of “federates” (simulation entities) (IEEE, 2010). The goal is to
promote the interoperability and reuse of simulation systems.
5See Harper and Lewis (2012) for a survey exploring the conceptualization and use of
“emergence” within contemporary economics.
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properties mimic the properties of a random number sequence.
Regarding the latter, PRNGs can be included among the methods of
decision-making agents, permitting them to “randomize” their behaviors. For
example, decision-making agents can use PRNGs to choose among equally
preferred actions or action delays, to construct mixed strategies in game
situations to avoid exploitable predictability, and to induce perturbations in
action routines in order to explore new action possibilities.
Figure 2: Agent taxonomy for an ACE watershed model. Up-pointing arrows denote “is a”
relationships and down-pointing arrows denote “has a” relationships. Source: Tesfatsion
et al. (2017).
Also, PRNGs can be included among the methods of other types of agents,
such as physical or biological agents, in order to model stochastic processes
external to decision-making agents. For example, Fig. 2 depicts the agent
taxonomy for an ACE watershed model (Tesfatsion et al., 2017) with up-
stream farmland and a downstream city subject to flooding. The Climate
agent uses a PRNG to generate a weather pattern (hourly rainfall amounts)
for each simulated year, which in turn affects Hydrology outcomes (river
water flow), Basin outcomes (water run-off), Farmland outcomes (bushels
per acre), Farmer outcomes (land allocation decisions), and City Manager
outcomes (budget allocation decisions).
An important constraint affecting the ACE modeling of stochasticity is
that the modeling principles (MP1)–(MP7) require an ACE model to be
dynamically complete. Thus, ACE modelers must identify the sources of any
stochastic shocks affecting events within their modeled worlds, not simply
their impact points, because all such shocks must come from agents actually
residing within these worlds. This requirement encourages ACE modelers
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to think carefully about the intended empirical referents for any included
stochastic shock terms. It also facilitates successive model development. For
example, a Climate agent represented as a highly simplified stochastic process
in a current modeling effort can easily be modified to have a more empirically
compelling representation in a subsequent modeling effort.
Another key issue is whether the modeling principles (MP1)–(MP7) imply
ACE models are necessarily pre-statable. As stressed by (Longo et al., 2012;
Koppl et al., 2015), the real world “bubbles forth” with an ever-evolving state
space, driven in part by random (acausal) events. This renders infeasible the
pre-statement of accurate equations of motion for real-world state processes.
ACE modeling addresses this issue in two ways. First, there is no require-
ment in ACE modeled worlds that the agents residing within these worlds be
able to accurately depict laws of motion for their states in equation form, or
in any other form. Second, data can be streamed into ACE models in a man-
ner that prevents even the modeler from being able to accurately pre-state
future model outcomes.
More precisely, suppose an ACE model has no run-time interaction with
any external system during times t ∈ [to, T ] for some finite horizon T . Then,
in principle, the modeler at time to could pre-state all model outcomes over
the time interval [to, T ], conditional on a given specification of agent states at
time to, in the same manner that he could in principle pre-state all possible
plays of a chess game with a given closure rule.
Nevertheless, modeling principles (MP1)–(MP7) do not imply ACE agents
have complete state information. Thus, ACE agents can experience events
that they have no way of knowing in advance.
For example, suppose an ACE model consists of a Climate agent interact-
ing over times t ∈ [to, T ] with a variety of other agents, as depicted in Fig. 2.
At the initial time to the modeler might know the weather pattern the Cli-
mate agent will generate over [to, T ], or be able to pre-state this weather
pattern based on the modeler’s time-to knowledge (or control) of the Climate
agent’s data, attributes, and methods. However, if other agents have no
access to the Climate agent’s internal aspects, they will experience weather
over [to, T ] as a stochastic process.
Alternatively, an ACE model can have run-time interactions with an ex-
ternal system. For example, as discussed by LeBaron and Tesfatsion (2008,
Section III) and Borrill and Tesfatsion (2011, Section 2.1), an ACE model
can be data driven; that is, it can include conduit agents permitting external
data to be streamed into the model during run-time that are unknown (or
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unknowable) by the modeler at the initial time to. In this case the modeler at
time to will not be able to pre-state future model outcomes, even in principle.
A particularly intriguing case to consider is when the data streamed into
an ACE modeled world include sequences of outcomes extracted from real-
world processes. For example, real-world weather data could be streamed into
a Climate agent that this agent then uses to generate a weather pattern for
its virtual world. These weather data could include thermal or atmospheric
noise data accessible to decision-making agents, enabling them to use “truly
random” numbers in place of PRNGs for their decision-making processes.
Finally, another important issue for ACE modelers is the representation
of time. ACE agents experience time as a sequence of event realizations.
In order for multiple agents to be able to coordinate their future actions on
the basis of time, they must have a common agreed-upon way to measure
the passage of time in terms of event realizations. For example, these event
realizations could be signals separately received from Clock agents with syn-
chronized digital displays, or the commonly observed cyclical motions of a
Sun agent. An open question is the extent to which this event-based modeling
of time reflects the real-world nature of time.6
3. ACE Objectives and Scope
Current ACE research divides roughly into four strands differentiated by
objective. One primary objective is empirical understanding : What explains
the appearance and persistence of empirical regularities? ACE researchers
seek possible causal mechanisms grounded in the successive interactions of
agents operating within computationally-rendered virtual worlds. A virtual
world capable of generating an empirical regularity of interest provides a can-
didate explanation for this regularity. If distinct virtual worlds are found to
have equivalent generative capability, further work must be done to adjudi-
cate among these candidate explanations based on the empirical plausibility
of their inputs and modeled processes (Epstein, 2006, pp. 8-10).
A second primary objective of ACE researchers is normative design: How
can ACE models be used as computational laboratories to facilitate the de-
sign of structures, institutions, and regulations resulting in desirable system
6As discussed by Borrill and Tesfatsion (2011, Sec. 4.2), philosophers of science and
physicists are still debating the real-world nature of time. For an important recent entry
into the debate, see Unger and Smolin (2014).
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performance over time? The ACE approach to normative design is akin to
filling a bucket with water to determine if it leaks. A researcher constructs
a virtual world that captures salient aspects of a system operating under a
proposed design. The researcher identifies a range of initial agent state spec-
ifications of interest, including seed values for agent PRNG methods. For
each such specification the researcher permits the virtual world to develop
over time driven solely by agent interactions. Recorded outcomes are then
used to evaluate design performance.
One key issue for ACE normative design is the extent to which resulting
outcomes are efficient, fair, and orderly, despite possible attempts by strategic
decision-making agents to game the design for personal advantage. A second
key issue is a cautionary concern for adverse unintended consequences. Opti-
mal design might not always be a realistic goal, especially for large complex
systems; but ACE models can facilitate robust design for increased system
resiliency, a goal that is both feasible and highly desirable.
A third primary objective of ACE researchers is qualitative insight and
theory generation: How can ACE models be used to study the potential
behaviors of dynamic systems over time? Ideally, what is needed is a dynamic
system’s phase portrait, i.e., a representation of its potential state trajectories
starting from all feasible initial states. Phase portraits reveal not only the
possible existence of equilibria but also the basins of attraction for any such
equilibria. Phase portraits thus help to clarify which regions of a system’s
state space are credibly reachable, hence of empirical interest, and which
are not. An ACE modeling of a dynamic system can be used to conduct
batched runs starting from multiple feasible initial states, thus providing a
rough approximation of the system’s phase portrait.
A fourth primary objective of ACE researchers is methodological advance-
ment : How best to provide ACE researchers with the methods and tools they
need to undertake theoretical studies of dynamic systems through systematic
sensitivity studies, and to examine the compatibility of sensitivity-generated
theories with real-world data? ACE researchers are exploring a variety of
ways to address this objective ranging from careful consideration of method-
ological principles to the practical development of programming, visualiza-
tion, and empirical validation tools.
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4. Enabling Comprehensive Empirical Validation
Modelers focused on the scientific understanding of real-world systems
want their models to have empirical validity (“consistency with real world
data”). Below are four distinct aspects of empirical validation which, ideally,
a model intended for scientific understanding should simultaneously achieve:
EV1. Input Validation: Are the exogenous inputs for the model empir-
ically meaningful and appropriate for the purpose at hand? Examples
of exogenous model inputs include functional forms, random shock re-
alizations, data-based parameter estimates, and/or parameter values
imported from other studies.
EV2. Process Validation: How well do the physical, biological, institu-
tional, and social processes represented within the model reflect real-
world aspects important for the purpose at hand? Are all process
specifications consistent with essential scaffolding constraints, such as
physical laws, stock-flow relationships, and accounting identities?
EV3. Descriptive Output Validation: How well are model-generated
outputs able to capture the salient features of the sample data used for
model identification? (in-sample fitting)
EV4. Predictive Output Validation: How well are model-generated out-
puts able to forecast distributions, or distribution moments, for sample
data withheld from model identification or for data acquired at a later
time? (out-of-sample forecasting)
In practice, economists relying solely on standard analytical modeling
tools do not place equal weight on these four aspects of empirical validation.
Particularly for larger-scale economic systems, such as macroeconomies, an-
alytical tractability issues and a desire to adhere to preconceived rationality,
optimality, and equilibrium ideals have forced severe compromises.
In contrast, an ACE model is an open-ended dynamic system. Starting
from an initial state, outcomes are determined forward through time, one
state leading to the next, in a constructive causal manner. This process does
not depend on the determination, or even the existence, of equilibrium states.
ACE thus provides researchers with epistemological flexibility, permitting
modeled agents to be tailored for particular purposes.
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In particular, ACE researchers can match modeled biological, physical, in-
stitutional, and social agents to their empirical counterparts in the real world.
This ability to match modeled agents to empirical counterparts, important
for scientific understanding, is also critical for normative design purposes.
Robustness of proposed designs against strategic manipulation can only be
assured in advance of implementation if the modeled decision-making agents
used to test the performance of these designs have the same degree of freedom
to engage in strategic behaviors as their empirical counterparts.
ACE modeling thus permits researchers to strive for the simultaneous
achievement of all four empirical validation aspects EV1 through EV4. This
pursuit of comprehensive empirical validation will of course be tempered in
practice by data limitations. Even in an era of Big Data advances, data
availability and quality remain important concerns (D’Orazio, 2016).
Computational limitations such as round-off error, truncation error, and
error propagation are also a concern. Advances in computer technology and
numerical approximation procedures are rapidly relaxing these limitations.
In the interim, however, as elegantly expressed by Judd (2006, p. 887), nu-
merical error must be traded off against specification error:
“The key fact is that economists face a trade-off between the
numerical errors in computational work and the specification er-
rors of analytically tractable models. Computationally intensive
approaches offer opportunities to examine realistic models, a valu-
able option even with the numerical errors. As Tukey (1962) puts
it, ‘Far better an approximate answer to the right question ...
than an exact answer to the wrong question ...’.”
Empirical validation of ACE models in the sense of EV1 through EV4 is a
highly active area of research. Extensive annotated pointers to this research
can be found at (Tesfatsion, 2017d).
15
Table 1: Policy Readiness Level (PRL) Classifications for Policy Models
Development Level PRL Description
Conceptual policy idea PRL 1 Conceptual formulation of a
policy with desired attributes
Analytic formulation PRL 2 Analytic characterization of a
policy with desired attributes
Modeling with PRL 3 Analysis of policy performance
low empirical fidelity using a highly simplified model
Small-scale modeling PRL 4 Policy performance tests using
with moderate a small-scale model embodying
empirical fidelity several salient real-world aspects
Small-scale modeling PRL 5 Policy performance tests using
with high empirical fidelity a small-scale model embodying
many salient real-world aspects
Prototype small-scale PRL 6 Policy performance tests
modeling using a small-scale model
reflecting expected field
conditions apart from scale
Prototype large-scale PRL 7 Policy performance tests using
modeling a large-scale model reflecting
expected field conditions
Field study PRL 8 Performance tests of policy
in expected final form under
expected field conditions
Real-world PRL 9 Implementation of policy in
implementation final form under a full range
of operating conditions
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5. Avoiding Premature Jumps to Policy Implementation
Ideally, changes in a society’s current institutional and regulatory poli-
cies should be guided by research that is strongly supported by empirical
evidence. Reaching a point where a proposed new policy is ready for real-
world implementation will typically require a series of modeling efforts at
different scales and with different degrees of empirical verisimilitude. Mov-
ing too soon to policy implementation on the basis of over-simplified models
entails major risk of adverse unintended consequences.
Consider, for example, the Policy Readiness Levels (PRLs)7 proposed in
Table 1 for research directed towards the design of institutional and/or regu-
latory policies. Due to relatively limited data and computational capabilities,
policy researchers at universities tend to work at PRLs 1-3. In contrast, pol-
icy researchers within industry, government, and regulatory agencies tend to
work at PRLs 7-9.
The interim PRLs 4-6 thus constitute a “valley of death” that hinders the
careful step-by-step development and testing of policy proposals from con-
ceptual formulation all the way to real-world implementation. Fortunately,
ACE modeling is well suited for bridging this valley because it facilitates the
construction of computational platforms8 permitting policy model develop-
ment and testing at PRLs 4-6. Examples are discussed in Section 7.
All nine levels in the PRL taxonomy are essential for ensuring concep-
tual policy ideas are brought to real-world fruition. Explicit recognition and
acceptance of this tiered model valuation could encourage policy researchers
to become more supportive of each other’s varied contributions.
6. Towards Standardized Protocols for Policy Model Presentations
The classification of policy models in accordance with policy readiness
levels (PRLs), as proposed in Section 5, could also help resolve another key
issue facing ACE policy researchers. Specifically, how can ACE models and
model findings undertaken for policy purposes be presented to stakeholders,
7These PRLs mimic, in rough form, the Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) devised
by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE, 2011, p. 22) to rank the readiness of proposed
new technologies for commercial application.
8In the current study the term computational platform is used to refer to a software
framework together with a library of software classes that permit the plug-and-play de-
velopment and study of a family of computational models.
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regulators, and other interested parties in a careful, clear, and compelling
manner (Wallace et al., 2015, Sections 3-4,6)?
Most ACE models are not simply the computational implementation of a
model previously developed in equation form. Rather, ACE modeling often
proceeds from agent taxonomy and flow diagrams, to pseudo code, and finally
to software programs that can be compiled and run. In this case the software
programs are the models. On the other hand, it follows from the modeling
principles presented in Section 2 that ACE models are initial-value state space
models. Consequently, in principle, the software program for any ACE model
can equivalently be represented in abstract form as a system of discrete-
time or discrete-event difference equations, starting from user-specified initial
conditions.9 These analytical representations become increasingly complex
as the number of agents increases. An example of such a representation is
given in Tesfatsion et al. (2017, Section 6.3).
The practical challenge facing ACE policy researchers then becomes how
best to present approximations of their models to interested parties who are
unable or unwilling to understand these models in coded or analytical form.
Most ACE policy researchers resort to verbal descriptions, simple graphical
depictions for model components and interactions, Unified Modeling Lan-
guage (UML) diagrams,10 and/or pseudo-code expressing the logical flow of
agent interactions over time. Anyone wishing to replicate reported results is
pointed to the original source code.
The lack of presentation protocols for ACE policy models (and for ACE
models more generally) has been severely criticized by economists who di-
rectly specify their models in analytical or statistical terms using commonly
accepted approaches. At the very least, it complicates efforts to communicate
model features and findings with clarity, thus hindering the accumulation of
9As discussed in Section 2, the ability to represent an ACE model in abstract analytical
form at an initial time to does not necessarily imply that the future outcomes of this model
are pre-statable at to, even in principle.
10The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is a general-purpose modeling language in-
tended to provide a standard way to design and visualize conceptual and software models.
UML diagrams enable partial graphical representations of a model’s structural (static)
and behavioral (dynamic) aspects. UML has become increasingly complex in successive
version releases and is not specifically tailored for dynamic systems driven by agent inter-
actions. Perhaps for these reasons, UML as a general modeling tool has not been widely
adopted by ACE/ABM researchers to date; see Collins et al. (2015) for further discussion
of these points.
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knowledge across successive modeling efforts.
Fortunately, the development of presentation protocols for agent-based
models is now an active area of research (Tesfatsion, 2016, 2017e). For exam-
ple, the ODD (Overview, Design concepts, and Details) protocol developed
by Grimm et al. (2006, 2010) has been widely adopted by ecologists who use
agent-based models.
To date, however, proposed protocols such as ODD have attempted to
provide “one size fits all” requirements for the presentation of models, re-
gardless of purpose and development level. The insistence on a single set of
presentation requirements can make it difficult to apply these protocols to
particular modeling efforts.
For example, a serious effort is undertaken by Tesfatsion et al. (2017)
to present an ACE watershed model in strict accordance with the ODD
protocol. As explained in Grimm et al. (2010, Table 1), the “overview” part of
the ODD protocol requires researchers to present a relatively detailed model
summary that covers purpose, entities, state variables, scales, processes, and
process scheduling. The “design concepts” part of the ODD protocol requires
researchers to discuss the basic principles underlying their model designs
and the extent to which these designs embody ten specific design principles
(e.g., emergence, adaptation, ...). The “details” part of the ODD protocol
requires researchers to provide complete technically accurate descriptions of
their models, including initialization, input data, and submodels (processes).
While the effort by Tesfatsion et al. (2017) to abide by the ODD protocol
did significantly improve the clarity of their model presentation, the following
serious problems were encountered:
 Too many reporting requirements for journal outlets: The three ODD
protocol requirements could not be met within the normal page lim-
its for Environmental Modelling & Software. Fortunately the editor
permitted publication even though the length of the published paper
exceeded normal page limits.
 Breakage of encapsulation: The ODD protocol defines agent states
solely in terms of agent attributes and requires separate reporting of
agent attributes from agent data and agent methods. In contrast, an
important property of ACE models is agent encapsulation, i.e., the
modeling of an agent as a bundle of data, attributes, and methods that
can be partially or completely hidden from other agents. Although the
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authors fulfilled this ODD protocol requirement, they also presented
figures and text descriptions that expressed and explained agents as
encapsulated entities.
 Presentation requirements not suitable for general readers: The “De-
tails” part of the ODD protocol requires submodels (processes) to be
presented in their entirety, using actual code names for parameters,
variables, and functional forms. The authors deviated from this re-
quirement to preserve general readability. The processes for the ACE
watershed model are carefully expressed in analytical form using stan-
dard mathematical notation for functions and variables. Readers desir-
ing to replicate and extend results reported for test-case11 simulations
of the ACE watershed model are directed to a website repository pro-
viding complete source code and test-case initialization data.
Given these difficulties with the “one size fits all” ODD protocol, a better
way to proceed would seem to be the development of multiple standardized
presentation protocols tailored to the purpose and development level of a
modeling effort. For example, for policy models, use could be made of the
PRL taxonomy presented in Table1.
Specifically, a protocol for PRL 1-3 models could require a complete model
presentation within the confines of a typical journal article. In contrast, a
protocol for PRL 4-7 models could consist of two sets of presentation require-
ments: one set for a summary model presentation to be reported within the
confines of a typical journal article; and a second set for a complete model
presentation (source code plus documentation) to be reported at a supple-
mentary website repository. Another important need for PRL 4-7 models is
the development of presentation protocols for test-case simulation studies, a
need not specifically addressed by the ODD protocol.
7. Edgier Explorations
In the early years of agent-based computational modeling, researchers cre-
ated and explored agent-based models populated with agents whose features
far exceeded traditional economic specifications. Agents could communicate
11A test case for an ACE model is a particular numerical specification for initial agent
states that permits the model to be simulated on a computer.
20
with each other using adaptively scripted messages, endogenously form their
interaction networks based on choice and refusal of interaction partners, move
around in spatially configured landscapes, use vision to locate resources, and
even reproduce in a manner mimicking genetic procreation. See, for exam-
ple, Epstein and Axtell (1996), Belew and Mitchell (1996), Arthur et al.
(1997), and the Schelling-Sakoda checkerboard-model research reviewed by
Hegselmann (2017).
In the process of tailoring studies for publication in economic journals,
these features have been trimmed or eliminated to the point that computa-
tional agents simply appear to be boundedly rational variants of traditional
economic agents. Readers could rightly wonder: Where is the revolution?
This section highlights a number of ways in which ACE models incor-
porating non-traditional specifications for computational agents could both
advance traditional economic research goals and expand research horizons.
7.1. ACE Modeling of Labor Markets as Evolutionary Sequential Games
The rightly celebrated work by Pissarides (2000) exploits data on job and
worker flows at a micro level in order to provide a better understanding of
critical labor market issues, such as endogenous job creation and destruc-
tion. This work relies on the use of an exogenously specified aggregate job-
matching function to approximate the process by which workers match with
employers in actual labor markets.
A number of ACE researchers have extended this work by permitting
workers and employers to match through an endogenous process. For exam-
ple, in (Tesfatsion, 2001) a group of workers and employers participate in a
sequential labor market game with adaptive job search and incomplete con-
tracts, implemented in C++ via the open-source Trade Network Game Labo-
ratory (Tesfatsion, 2017f). The Pissarides aggregate job-matching function is
replaced with an endogenous preferential worker-employer matching process
based on the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm (Roth, 2008).
More precisely, as depicted in Fig. 3, at the beginning of each work pe-
riod the workers communicate work offers to their most preferred employers
deemed acceptable on the basis of past work-site interactions (or prior judg-
ments). Employers immediately refuse work offers from applicants deemed
unacceptable on the basis of past work-site interactions (or prior judgments)
and place all remaining work offers in their applicant pools. Refused workers
either redirect their work offers to acceptable next-most-preferred employers
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Figure 3: An ACE sequential labor market game. Hiring, firing, and quits are endoge-
nously determined by the successive strategic decisions of workers (W) and employers (E)
based on past work-site interactions. Dark (black) arrows indicate accepted work offers,
and lighter (purple) arrows indicate refused work offers. Source: Tesfatsion (2001).
(if any such employers exist) or become unemployed. Once all employer ap-
plicant pools have stabilized, each employer accepts work offers from among
the most preferred workers in his applicant pool (up to his hiring capacity)
and refuses the rest. This determines worker-employer matches, vacancies,
and unemployment for the current work period.
Matched workers and employers then participate in work-site games.
Workers and employers use the outcomes of their work-site game interactions
to update: (i) their preference orderings over potential work-site partners,
hence the manner in which they make, choose, and/or refuse work offers in
the next work period; and (ii) their game strategies for work-site interactions
in the next work period.
In subsequent mentions of this work in the economics literature, the fol-
lowing non-traditional aspects have typically not been noted. Workers and
employers engage in direct adaptive communication to implement an en-
dogenous matching process. Workers and employers use genetic algorithms
to evolve “new ideas” regarding appropriate game strategies for use in work-
site interactions. Matching theory is blended with game theory in order to
permit the endogenous choice and refusal of game partners.
Various other ACE modelers have exploited agent capabilities to open
up new labor market research directions as well. See Tesfatsion (2017g) for
annotated pointers to this research.
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7.2. ACE Macroeconomic Modeling with Anticipatory Learning
A growing number of researchers have become interested in the study
of macroeconomic systems for which agents are forward-looking optimizers
with incomplete knowledge about the structure of the economy. As surveyed
in Evans and Honkapohja (2013), the standard context assumed in this lit-
erature is that a representative consumer with learning capabilities resides
in a dynamic world consisting of itself, a representative firm, and a govern-
ment policy-maker. The representative consumer has incomplete information
about the structure of its world, and it behaves as an econometrician in its
attempts to learn about its world from observed data.
Specifically, the representative consumer makes consumption and labor
decisions in each successive time period conditional on intertemporal budget
constraints. These budget constraints depend on current state variables (e.g.,
financial and physical asset values), on current and forecasted future values
for system variables (e.g., goods prices, wages, and interest rates), and on
current and forecasted future values for government policy variables (e.g.,
tax rates). The consumer’s system variable forecasts are obtained from a
reduced-form econometric model. The consumer estimates and updates the
parameters of this econometric model over time, often by means of a least-
squares or Bayesian learning method. The consumer’s government policy
variable forecasts are generated by means of the latest announced government
policy rule, assumed to be credible common knowledge.
Functional forms and calibrated maintained parameter values are spec-
ified in the initial time period to guarantee the existence of a steady-state
solution, assumed to be common knowledge. A temporary equilibrium solu-
tion for the macroeconomic model is then approximately determined in dif-
ferenced form (i.e., differenced from steady-state values) in each successive
time period. A key concern is to analyze how different learning specifications
affect the properties of these temporary equilibria, e.g., will they converge
over time to the steady-state solution (in either a global or local stability
sense), or will they persistently deviate from this solution.
Clearly this literature takes an important step towards more realistic
macroeconomic modeling by recognizing the constrained information and
computational capabilities of decision-making agents. Nevertheless, locally-
constructive decision-making is still not ensured; external coordination, equi-
librium, and optimality conditions are imposed on agents both intertem-
porally and cross-sectionally in order to obtain model solutions. Exam-
ples of such conditions include: single representative consumer assumptions;
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the guaranteed existence of steady-state solutions; non-constructive common
knowledge assumptions; the assumed coordination of agents on a single tem-
porary equilibrium solution in each time period; the assumed satisfaction
of non-constructive transversality conditions for consumer optimization; the
assumed absence of interest-rate arbitrage opportunities; the assumed ab-
sence of ponzi-game opportunities such as persistent debt roll-over; and the
assumed absence of excess supplies and demands in markets.
This failure to ensure local constructivity has important consequences.
Real-world decision makers are forced to be locally constructive, which places
limits on their expressed behaviors. Idealized behavioral benchmarks are use-
ful for the specification of performance metrics, providing upper limits for
such metrics; but an insistence on idealized behavioral specifications for all
modeled economic decision-makers hinders understanding of real-world eco-
nomic systems. For scientific modeling purposes, the relevant set of decision-
making processes lies within the set of locally-constructive decision-making
processes; and “rationality” should properly be defined relative to this set.
ACE macroeconomic modeling permits the systematic study of locally-
constructive decision processes in macroeconomic contexts. Extensive anno-
tated pointers to this work can be accessed at (Tesfatsion, 2017h).
To date, however, most ACE macroeconomic researchers have postulated
decision rules for decision-making agents that are not explicitly derived as
solutions for optimization problems, although they are sometimes motivated
as heuristic approximations for such solutions. This has led some macroe-
conomists to dismiss ACE macroeconomic modeling based on the incor-
rect belief that ACE decision-making agents must necessarily be reactive
stimulus-response agents with myopic objectives. To the contrary, how-
ever, as concretely demonstrated by Sinitskaya and Tesfatsion (2015), the
locally-constructive decision processes used by ACE decision-making agents
can range from simple fixed rules to intertemporal optimization based on
sophisticated anticipatory learning algorithms.
Specifically, Sinitskaya and Tesfatsion (2015) take a standard macroe-
conomic model in which consumers and firms have intertemporal utility-
maximizing and profit-maximizing objectives and introduce four important
changes. First, all externally imposed market clearing and rational expecta-
tions assumptions are removed. Second, consumers and firms are modeled
as locally-constructive agents with learning methods. Third, as depicted in
Fig. 4, consumers and firms attempt to satisfy their objectives through par-
ticipation in an open-ended sequence of locally-constructive market activities
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Figure 4: Locally-constructive trading sequence in each period t for consumers and firms
in an ACE macroeconomic model who have learning capabilities and seek to maximize
intertemporal utility and profits. Source: Sinitskaya and Tesfatsion (2015).
for which every purchase must be backed by actual purchasing power (money
balances). Fourth, firms that become insolvent must exit the economy.
Four learning methods are tested for consumers and firms in the resulting
Dynamic Macroeconomic (DM) Game: (i) A simple reactive reinforcement
learning algorithm due to Roth and Erev (1995) that asks “if this happens,
what should I do?”; (ii) Q-learning (Watkins, 1989), a well-known antici-
patory learning algorithm that asks “if I do this, what will happen?”; (iii)
an anticipatory rolling-horizon learning method; and (iv) an anticipatory
stochastic dynamic programming learning method involving the adaptive up-
dating of value functions approximated by basis functions.12
Welfare outcomes for consumers and firms are generated under 44 differ-
ent learning-method combinations. The best combination turns out to be
when all consumers and firms engage in rolling-horizon learning; the welfare
outcomes for this combination are shown to constitute a Pareto-optimal Nash
equilibrium relative to the set of 44 tested learning combinations.
7.3. ACE Modeling of Coupled Natural and Human Systems
ACE modeling enables researchers to study economic processes as critical
components of coupled natural and human (CNH) systems. This permits
consideration of a broader range of potential causal factors for economic
12Source code (C++) and initialization data for this DM Game sensitivity study can be
accessed at (Sinitskaya, 2015).
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outcomes of interest. Extensive annotated pointers to ACE CNH research
can be accessed at (Tesfatsion, 2017i).
Figure 5: An ACE watershed test system, implemented by means of the WACCShed
Platform, that focuses on local governance issues for the Squaw Creek watershed in central
Iowa. Source: Tesfatsion et al. (2017).
For example, Tesfatsion et al. (2017) develop an open-source ACE com-
putational platform in Java for the study of watersheds under evolving cli-
mate conditions, referred to as the W ater And C limate C hange Watershed
(WACCShed) Platform. This platform permits a careful modeling of the
natural and institutional environment that shapes and channels the actions
of human watershed participants. In turn, as advocated by An (2012), the
platform permits a watershed environment to be affected by the actions of
its human participants.
An ACE watershed test system implemented by means of the WACCShed
Platform is presented in detail in order to demonstrate, in concrete terms,
the capabilities and use of the WACCShed Platform. As depicted in Fig. 2
and Fig. 5, this test system captures, in highly simplified form, the structural
attributes of the Squaw Creek watershed in central Iowa.
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The test system restricts attention to two types of decision makers, a
representative farmer and a city manager, in order to identify with care the
manner in which their strategic interactions and risk-management practices
result in an intrinsic dynamic coupling of natural and human systems over
time. Illustrative findings are reported showing the sensitivity of farmer
and city social welfare outcomes to changes in three key treatment factors:
farmer land-allocation decision method; farmer targeted savings level; and
levee quality effectiveness for the mitigation of city flood damage.
Source code and initialization data for the ACE watershed test system
can be accessed at the WACCShed homepage (Jie et al., 2016).
7.4. ACE Modeling of Critical Infrastructure Systems
As stressed in Section 5, ACE computational platforms are increasingly
being used to study proposed policies in advance of implementation. This sec-
tion illustrates this use for a complex critical infrastructure system: namely,
U.S. centrally-managed wholesale electric power markets.
Figure 6: An ACE computational platform permitting study of U.S. ISO-managed whole-
sale electric power markets. Source: Tesfatsion (2017j).
The AMES (Agent-based M odeling of E lectricity Systems) Test Bed is
an open-source ACE computational platform permitting the open-ended dy-
namic study of wholesale electric power markets operating over transmission
27
grids subject to grid congestion (Tesfatsion, 2017j). AMES incorporates, in
simplified form, the core features of the two-settlement system design pro-
posed by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for U.S. wholesale
electric power markets. To date, this design has been adopted in seven U.S.
energy regions (CAISO, ERCOT, ISO-NE, MISO, NYISO, PJM, SPP) en-
compassing over 60% of U.S. generation capacity.
The latest released version of AMES (V4.0) is a modular extensible plat-
form developed in Java and Python. As depicted in Fig. 6, the key features
of AMES (V4.0) are as follows:
1. Market Participants: These include: Load Serving Entities (LSEs)
that demand wholesale electric power in order to service the loads
(power demands) of their retail customers; and generators that produce
and supply electric power from both dispatchable and non-dispatchable
resources. Each participant is modeled as a private business entity
whose goal is to secure the highest possible net earnings from its mar-
ket activities over time. At the beginning of each simulation run, the
user-specified methods of the LSEs and dispatchable generators include
demand bid and supply offer functions, and they can also include learn-
ing algorithms permitting the endogenous updating of these functions
over time.
2. Central Management: Grid and market operations are centrally
managed by a non-profit Independent System Operator (ISO) whose
goal is to maintain the reliable, efficient, and fair operation of the
wholesale electric power system over time.
3. Two-Settlement System: On each successive day the ISO conducts
a bid/offer-based Day-Ahead Market (DAM) to determine hourly re-
source commitments and dispatch levels for next-day operations as well
as a Real-Time Market (RTM) to correct for any imbalances between
day-ahead dispatch schedules and real-time power needs. Each market
is separately settled by Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP), i.e., the
pricing of power by the timing and location of its withdrawal from, or
injection into, the transmission grid.
4. AC Transmission Grid. The LSEs and generators are located at
user-specified locations across a user-specified alternating current (AC)
transmission grid. Grid congestion is managed via LMP.
The AMES Test Bed has been used to study a number of policy is-
sues, including: stochastic versus deterministic market-clearing methods for
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day-ahead markets; effects of increasing wind power penetration and price-
responsive demands on the efficiency, reliability, and fairness of system op-
erations; and the effects of locational marginal pricing on the amounts of
net surplus extracted from market operations by LSEs, generators, and the
ISO. Software downloads, manuals, tutorials, and publication links can be
accessed at the AMES homepage (Tesfatsion, 2017j).
AMES is a key component of an integrated transmission and distribution
system platform currently under development. As discussed in Section 7.5,
the purpose of this platform is to facilitate the study of new types of “trans-
active energy system” designs for electric power systems that are based more
fully on economic transactions.
7.5. ACE Modeling Principles as Real-World Design Principles
As stressed by Borrill and Tesfatsion (2011, Section 2.1), real-world sys-
tems whose architectures are designed in accordance with agent-based model-
ing principles can, in turn, be simulated by agent-based models that embody
their basic architecture and constituent agent types. This duality provides
unprecedented opportunities for deep empirical validation.
In recent years, agent-based modeling principles are increasingly being
used to design “bottom up” Transactive Energy System (TES) architectures
for electric power systems (GAC, 2015; Tesfatsion, 2017k). TES architec-
tures are decentralized market-based mechanisms that permit electric power
systems to operate more fully in accordance with core economic principles.
More precisely, a TES architecture is a set of economic and control mech-
anisms that permits the balancing of power supplies and demands across
an entire electric power system, consistent with system reliability. The in-
tent is to enhance value for all participants subject to physical and security
constraints. A key characteristic of TES architectures is a stress on decen-
tralization. Information technology is viewed as the nervous system that will
permit management of an electric power system to be shared by a society
of distributed resource owners, customers, and other stakeholders. The ulti-
mate TES objective is to achieve “a loosely coupled set of controls with just
enough information exchange to allow for stability and global optimization
through local action” (GAC, 2015, p. 10).
For example, TES researchers such as Kok (2013) are investigating the
possibility of introducing various forms of aggregators able to harness ancil-
lary services from collections of distributed energy resources (DERs) owned
by businesses and households connected to distribution grids. Examples
29
of DERs include distributed generation (e.g., rooftop photovoltaic panels),
battery storage systems, and household appliances with energy storage capa-
bilities and flexible power needs that permit collections of these appliances
to function as prosumers, i.e., as entities that can produce or consume power
depending on local conditions.
Harnessing of services from DERs for real-time operations requires vol-
untary participation by DER owners, hence it requires the creation of value
streams that can be used to compensate DER owners appropriately for pro-
vided DER services. In addition, it requires technological developments such
as local device management by intelligent software agents to ensure DER
response to real-time electronic signals in a timely and accurate manner.
Figure 7: An ACE computational platform permitting the study of transactive energy
system designs for U.S. electric power systems. Source: Tesfatsion (2017k)
Figure 7 depicts an open-source ACE computational platform currently
under development by research teams from Iowa State University and Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory. The purpose of this platform is to facilitate
the performance study of integrated transmission and distribution (T/D)
systems operating under TES designs.
Key aspects of this platform are as follows. An ISO-managed whole-
sale electric power market operating over a high-voltage (HV) transmission
grid is tightly linked through DER/load aggregators to a distribution system
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operating over a lower-voltage (LV) distribution grid. The participants in
the distribution system include DERs (distributed generation, storage, pro-
sumers), locally managed by intelligent price-responsive software agents, as
well as conventional (non-price-responsive) loads. An important characteris-
tic of such a system is that data, signals, and power can flow up as well as
down between the wholesale/transmission and retail/distribution sectors.
8. A Spectrum of Experiment-Based Models
As depicted in Fig. 8, it is now feasible to develop experiment-based
models that permit subjects to range all the way from 100% real people to
100% computer agents. The key question is whether it is worthwhile.
Figure 8: Spectrum of experiment-based models with subjects ranging from 100% human
to 100% computer agents.
The arguments in favor are many. Experiments based entirely on hu-
man subjects must typically be kept short, with relatively simple experi-
mental settings, to avoid excessive subject compensation costs and subject
misunderstanding of instructions. In contrast, experiments based solely on
computer agents can generate simulated outcomes for complex problem envi-
ronments over long time horizons at relatively low expense. Nevertheless, if
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human behaviors are misspecified, these simulated outcomes can be seriously
misleading.
Mixed experiment-based models that combine human subjects and com-
puter agents permit experimenters to postulate more realistic experimental
settings for their human subjects by letting computer agents represent crit-
ical but complicated real-world aspects. They also permit the systematic
study of human behaviors within controlled group settings, from small to
large, by letting computer agents represent “others” in these groups. In
addition, they provide a way for computer agents to be trained in situ to
embody human decision-making behaviors before they are used to represent
human decision-making behaviors in longer-run studies. Annotated links to
economic research using mixed experiment-based models can be found at
(Tesfatsion, 2017l).
An interesting related topic is serious gaming, i.e., the development of
game environments that are designed for teaching, training, and research
purposes and not simply for entertainment. While by no means a new topic,
serious gaming has attracted increased attention since 2002 due to both eco-
nomic and technological factors (Djaouti et al., 2011). Current serious game
releases typically take the form of computerized games that involve mixed
play among human and computer-implemented participants.
9. Concluding Remarks
This study starts with the claim that real-world economic systems are
locally-constructive sequential games. It then strives to demonstrate, through
general analysis and concrete examples, that ACE modeling provides a prac-
tical useful way for economists to represent and study real-world economic
systems as locally-constructive sequential games.
The ultimate goal of this study is the routine inclusion of ACE modeling
within the toolkits of economists as a useful complement to current model-
ing approaches. Expansions of toolkits with new modeling tools providing
additional research capabilities should be embraced, not fought, as Pareto-
improving evolutions of economic methodology.
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